for all you game theorists out there...

[doublesuited 0]

For all you game theorists out there.Here is a simple game with two players, A and B. A is given $1000 and is ableto split it between he and B any way he chooses. B has the option to accept orreject the offer. If he accepts the offer, the money is divided according toA's split. If B rejects the offer, both players get nothing.At face value, this game isn't interesting if played one time. B should alwaysaccept. However, if this game is played 1000 times. it gets more interesting. Now consider that there will be 10 games going on at the same time with 10 different As and 10 different Bs. For the competition, the As are competing against the other As, not their actual opponent in the game. What is A's optimal offer strategy? What is B's optimal strategy?

[Geezy 0]

all or nothing

[DaBruins 0]

For all you game theorists out there.Here is a simple game with two players, A and B. A is given $1000 and is ableto split it between he and B any way he chooses. B has the option to accept orreject the offer. If he accepts the offer, the money is divided according toA's split. If B rejects the offer, both players get nothing.At face value, this game isn't interesting if played one time. B should alwaysaccept. However, if this game is played 1000 times. it gets more interesting. Now consider that there will be 10 games going on at the same time with 10 different As and 10 different Bs. For the competition, the As are competing against the other As, not their actual opponent in the game. What is A's optimal offer strategy? What is B's optimal strategy?

hard to say what the optimal strategy is considering you are really playing so many opponents and must have others cooperate with you who obviously have their own agenda.

[Spademan 94]

For all you game theorists out there.Here is a simple game with two players, A and B. A is given $1000 and is ableto split it between he and B any way he chooses. B has the option to accept orreject the offer. If he accepts the offer, the money is divided according toA's split. If B rejects the offer, both players get nothing.At face value, this game isn't interesting if played one time. B should alwaysaccept. However, if this game is played 1000 times. it gets more interesting. Now consider that there will be 10 games going on at the same time with 10 different As and 10 different Bs. For the competition, the As are competing against the other As, not their actual opponent in the game. What is A's optimal offer strategy? What is B's optimal strategy?

Can A tell be what he's going to do?If so, A should offer 1 dollar every time.B can either get 1000 bucks, or nothing.Pretty easy choice if he knows those are his options, and A walks away with tons.

[econ_tim 0]

For all you game theorists out there.Here is a simple game with two players, A and B. A is given $1000 and is ableto split it between he and B any way he chooses. B has the option to accept orreject the offer. If he accepts the offer, the money is divided according toA's split. If B rejects the offer, both players get nothing.At face value, this game isn't interesting if played one time. B should alwaysaccept. However, if this game is played 1000 times. it gets more interesting. Now consider that there will be 10 games going on at the same time with 10 different As and 10 different Bs. For the competition, the As are competing against the other As, not their actual opponent in the game. What is A's optimal offer strategy? What is B's optimal strategy?

As long as the game isn't infinitely repeated, the strategy for a rational player A to offer zero (or one penny to player B) and for a rational player B to accept.I'll think a little more, but I'm pretty sure this is right.

[Spademan 94]

As long as the game isn't infinitely repeated, the strategy for a rational player A to offer zero (or one penny to player B) and for a rational player B to accept.I'll think a little more, but I'm pretty sure this is right.

Wasn't thinking in terms of less than 1 dollar offers.If we can break it down to pennies, then yes, 1 penny.

[AngloBoy 0]

For all you game theorists out there.Here is a simple game with two players, A and B. A is given $1000 and is ableto split it between he and B any way he chooses. B has the option to accept orreject the offer. If he accepts the offer, the money is divided according toA's split. If B rejects the offer, both players get nothing.At face value, this game isn't interesting if played one time. B should alwaysaccept. However, if this game is played 1000 times. it gets more interesting. Now consider that there will be 10 games going on at the same time with 10 different As and 10 different Bs. For the competition, the As are competing against the other As, not their actual opponent in the game. What is A's optimal offer strategy? What is B's optimal strategy?

As long as the game isn't infinitely repeated, the strategy for a rational player A to offer zero (or one penny to player B) and for a rational player B to accept.I'll think a little more, but I'm pretty sure this is right.

If player A offers player B nothing why would he accept ??? If player B knows the rules he has the upper hand all of the way. Because he has to approve the split. So it could go something like thisplayer A "how about i give you 2%"player B "no, i want 50%"game 1 player A 0 player B 0player A "how about i give you 3%"player B "no, i want 50%"game 2 player A 0 player B 0etc. etc.

[Pupsta 0]

what is the incentive for B to ever turn it down if it's > 0?

[AngloBoy 0]

what is the incentive for B to ever turn it down if it's > 0?

If he knows the rules, he'd be an idiot not to try and get himself more money.

[Pupsta 0]

what is the incentive for B to ever turn it down if it's > 0?

If he knows the rules, he'd be an idiot not to try and get himself more money.

imo, A has the complete upper hand, because B is a fool to refuse ANYTHING. if A denies B's request for more money, B is still going to accept and take his dollar. $1 > $0

[AngloBoy 0]

what is the incentive for B to ever turn it down if it's > 0?

If he knows the rules, he'd be an idiot not to try and get himself more money.

imo, A has the complete upper hand, because B is a fool to refuse ANYTHING. if A denies B's request for more money, B is still going to accept and take his dollar. $1 > $0

Interesting, If I was B and A was saying he would take $999 and give me $1 ..... I think i'd say no "I want 50% or your not getting jack buddy" and then I'd probable mumble something under my breath like "lousy little **** only offering me $1 ****ing out of $1000 I know he wants to beat those other ****ing A's so let's see how long he keeps up this shit"

[AngloBoy 0]

But then that's the point of game theory as John Nash wrote it, isn't it ?Rather than going for the big score which could be rejected, you take the shot that has the percentage chance of being succesful.So A walks up to B and says "I really want to beat those other A's but I don't want to screw you over so how about I give you 25%, that way we're both winners"Doesn't mean it will work, but I think that's the game theory principle.

[econ_tim 0]

Interesting, If I was B and A was saying he would take $999 and give me $1 ..... I think i'd say no "I want 50% or your not getting jack buddy" and then I'd probable mumble something under my breath like "lousy little censored only offering me $1 ****ing out of $1000 I know he wants to beat those other ****ing A's so let's see how long he keeps up this censored"

Yeah. The statement of the game should make sure that A and B only care about their total payoffs and nothing else.That is, they don't have hurt feelings or get jealous.Otherwise you could get a lot of different solutions to the game.

[DaBruins 0]

but B isn't a fool and he knows if he keeps rejecting A then A won't be able to stand the heat and will eventually have to give him more money (lets say for example B refuses 10 straight times, well he greatly increases the odds that A ups the offer, and if A doesnt then B has only lost 10 bucks). My answer would be simple, A and B collude and make a deal that insures that they win. This way, A offers B $0 and B accepts each and every time. Then at the end, they split all the profits. This is less profitable for A then just giving B 1 dollar at a time, but when A does give B 1 dollar each time there is no guarantee B will accept it and there is also a chance that they could lose. A deal insures huge ++++++EV

[Suited_Up 2]

If it's a competition between a set of A's and a set of B'sThen the winner is whoever comes out with the most in the end... which team that is.If B's want to win, they have to ask for at least 50% (51 to win) every time or don't let A get anything either. Eventually A will either have to give 50% or neither will get anything. Eventually they will break even, or the A's won't get a dime either.

[teneight 1]

the best strategy for player A is to offer a high percentage to player B right off the bat where he can't refuse not to take it. ., . around 33% to player B would be big enough. player B not knowing that he could get more, he would probably accept a big offer up front. 33,000 dollars right off the bat is a lot of money for someone to turn down....but i might be wrong. i just took a guessif player A offers very little in the first offer, and only goes up by small increments, then player B will most likely refuse over and over..so in the end, they are both losing money.im still trying to figure out player B

[pokepoke1967 0]

Can you rename the players X and Y? All the A's and B's confuse me. Thank you in advance.

[pokepoke1967 0]

Offer Y a multi-"time" offer with an upfront signing bonus, but that will keep X under the salary cap over the "1000 times".